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I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2006, the Wisconsin Legislature passed 2005 Wisconsin Act 335, 
creating the Wisconsin Aerospace Authority (WAA).1  Unique to this particular 
act is the enumeration of the power to acquire intellectual property by the 
WAA.2  While granting them the power to acquire intellectual property is not 
unique, there is an interesting problem with that acquisition: the Act does not 
conform to the Parker Doctrine, and thus allows the WAA to be subject to 
antitrust litigation in its intellectual property acquisition under the proper 
circumstances.  Specifically, the Act allows the WAA to enter into exclusive 
contracts that allow the WAA to acquire intellectual property rights in patents 
and copyrights.  If entering into these contracts are found to be in violation of 
antitrust law, the contracts could be challenged, and state contract law would 
be preempted by federal patent or copyright law.  If federal law preempts state 
law and the contractual relationship is a violation of antitrust law, the specific 
provisions of the Act that allow for intellectual property rights acquisition could 
be held void.  The key factor is the broad language in the Act and the limitless 
authority it grants to the WAA in acquiring intellectual property.  While the 
 
1.  S.B. 352, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2006). 
2.  See WIS. STAT § 114.62(6) (2015–16). 
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cause of such broad language is left to speculation,  the remedy to prevent such 
an action can lie in other states’ aerospace authority statutes, such as the Alaska 
Aerospace Corporation and the New Mexico Regional Spaceport District.3  
This Comment will address the broad language of the Wisconsin statute that 
allows for intellectual property acquisition, focusing particularly on patents, the 
history of the antitrust law applied to state-owned entities, the circumstances 
needed for intellectual property acquisition to violate antitrust law, and the 
potential remedies. 
The problem with addressing these issues is that the issues are unique and 
rarely occur.  While state-owned entities are no stranger to intellectual property 
acquisition,4 my research was unable to locate any state-owned entity acquiring 
any intellectual property through anticompetitive behavior.  Furthermore, my 
research uncovered only one article into potential state antitrust behavior in 
acquiring intellectual property, albeit, on a federal level.5  And while trade 
secret misappropriation has resulted in patent applications, which have 
subsequently been denied, the very notion of state antitrust behavior seems 
contrary to the nature of private research, invention, and patent application 
imbued into the America Invents Act.6  This Comment will first address the 
Wisconsin laws and the history of antitrust laws applied to state-owned entities.  
Next, part two will address how Wisconsin could violate those antitrust laws in 
their independent research and invention for a potential patent, and how that 
violation could preempt state common law.  Part three will then address 
potential remedies, including, but not limited to patent sharing, broad oversight, 
and revision of those laws.  Part four suggests revisions to the current laws to 
prevent state antitrust activity. 
II. CONSTRUING THE LAW 
Imagine this scenario: the WAA enters into an exclusive contract with the 
Astronautics Corporation of America (ACA), based in Milwaukee, to launch 
rockets from Spaceport Sheboygan to test new equipment the ACA is 
developing for the new Orion spacecraft.  This new equipment, if proven 
 
3.  See ALASKA STAT. § 26.27 (2014); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5–16 (2010).  
4.  See About Us, BERKELEY IPIRA, http://ipira.berkeley.edu/about-us [https://perma.cc/5RK
4-LEG6] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).  At the University of Wisconsin, all patents are held by the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, a private, nonprofit company that handles all patents and 
licensing.   See About Us, WARF, http://www.warf.org/about-us/about-us.cmsx [https://perma.cc/TU
P9-VK47]  (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). However, the University of Wisconsin can and does maintain 
other forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets.  See W, 
Registration No. 4,591,526.   
5.  See infra note 40. 
6.  See 35 U.S.C. § 119 (2012). 
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through these tests, will allow for better aeronautic measurements than GPS, 
which, if mass produced, could eventually be put into every new manufactured 
airplane as well.  One provision in this contract allows the WAA a partial 
ownership in any patents acquired by testing this equipment, since the WAA 
was integral in its creation, as it manages the only spaceport in the entire 
Midwest that is licensed for the launching of spacecraft.  However, since the 
WAA has a monopoly over Midwestern space launches (and since there are no 
other Midwestern spaceports), such an exclusive contract could be challenged 
by Orbital Technologies, a competing aerospace engineering company out of 
Madison, as violating antitrust laws. This challenge could result in state 
contract law being preempted by federal law.  If that law is preempted and 
found to violate federal antitrust law, then those specific provisions of the 
Wisconsin statutes that allowed the WAA to acquire intellectual property rights 
would be void. 
A. The Powers of the Wisconsin Aerospace Authority 
This may seem like a farfetched idea, but it will be a reality because of the 
specific statutory language.  Wisconsin statute section 114.62 states, “the 
authority may . . . [m]ake and execute contracts and other legal instruments 
necessary or convenient for the conduct of its business or to the exercise of its 
powers.”7  Additionally, the statute states 
the authority may . . .  [a]cquire, own, lease, construct, develop, plan, 
design, establish, create, improve, enlarge, reconstruct, equip, finance, 
operate, manage, and maintain . . . [a]ny spaceport [and] [a]ny 
intangible property right, including any patent . . . copyright . . . or 
other right acquired under federal or state law, common law, or the law 
of any foreign country.8 
Under this provision, the WAA can enter into a contract to acquire a patent 
through an exclusive contract to test an invention at Spaceport Sheboygan.  This 
is because of the lack of limiting language in the statute.  It basically gives 
limitless authority to the WAA to enter into any contract and acquire virtually 
any intellectual property rights through those contracts so long as they are 
“convenient for the conduct of business” or are an “exercise of its powers,”9 of 
which includes the acquisition of intellectual property rights.  The problem with 
this broad authority granted to the WAA is it violates antitrust laws if the state 
 
7.  WIS. STAT. § 114.62(7) (2015–16).  
8.  Id. 
9.    Id. 
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enters such contract. 
B.  The Principles of Antitrust Law 
The applicability of antitrust laws to state-owned entities is outlined in the 
landmark case Parker v. Brown.10  The California Agricultural Prorate Act 
(CAPA) was challenged by the Department of Agriculture under the antitrust 
laws of the Sherman Act, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 
and the Commerce Clause.11  The Supreme Court found that the Sherman Act 
did not necessarily prohibit any legislative act of states, nor did the CAPA 
violate any other federal laws.12  However, in evaluating the application of the 
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court stated that the state must “exercise[] its 
legislative authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions 
of its application.”13  This created a two-part test: first, the state must clearly 
state an affirmative policy to allow anticompetitive conduct, and second, it must 
provide active supervision of that anticompetitive conduct.14 
While the CAPA did not violate antitrust laws, when the two-part test has 
been applied to other state entities, the Court has found otherwise.  In North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, the 
Court found that a non-sovereign entity is not entitled to immunity, stating 
“active market participants cannot be allowed to regulate their own markets 
free from antitrust accountability.”15  In other words, an entity cannot engage 
in anticompetitive activities unless the state law specifically allows them to do 
so.  Additionally, in Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance, the 
Court found that the state must actively supervise, stating “mere potential for 
state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State.”16  
Thus, for a state-owned entity to be exempt under the Parker Doctrine, the state 
must explicitly provide that the entity can engage in antitrust activity, and the 
state must actively monitor that activity. 
C.  Preemption of State Contract Law 
If the WAA does engage in antitrust behavior, the second issue with the Act 
creating the WAA is the federal preemption of state contract law.  Beginning 
with jurisdiction, section 1338 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code grants federal courts 
 
10. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
11. Id. at 344. 
12. Id. at 350–351, 358, 368. 
13. Id. at 352. 
14. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
15. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111 (2015).  
16. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992). 
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original jurisdiction of any civil claim relating to patents and copyrights.17  
Additionally, section 1338(b) states that district courts will have jurisdiction of 
civil actions that assert “a claim of unfair competition when joined with a 
substantial and related claim under the copyright [or] patent laws.”18  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “unfair competition” as “[t]he body of law 
encompassing various business and privacy torts, all generally based on 
deceitful trade practices, including passing off, false advertising, commercial 
disparagement, and misappropriation.”19  Thus, jurisdiction is based upon how 
substantial the claim addresses patent and copyright law, and additionally, 
whether that claim can be tied to unfair competition, including 
misappropriation. 
However, courts have held that if there is an extra element in a contract 
claim that is purely the jurisdiction of the state, the state will maintain 
jurisdiction in that case.  The Sixth Circuit in the famous case of Wrench v. 
Taco Bell found that this extra element prevented preemption of intellectual 
property claims under section 106 of the Copyright Act, namely, the promise 
to pay.  The court stated “[a] cause of action for unjust enrichment could be 
assimilable to a cause of action sounding in contract, for it would then contain 
an essential element not envisioned by Section 106.”20  Additionally, in Cover 
v. Hydramatic Packing Company, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
found that patent law does not necessarily preempt state commercial contract 
law.21  The court held that “[t]here is simply nothing on the face of [federal 
patent law] that pertains to anyone but the infringer and the patentee.  At issue, 
therefore, is the legal relationship between two contracting parties, and it is 
[state law] which defines this relationship.”22  However, if no extra element of 
commercial activity is claimed, and the contract, as a whole, falls under 
antitrust laws, or is a patenting license agreement, then federal law would 
preempt state law.  Thus, Wisconsin would have to defend the actions of the 
WAA in federal court under federal law, not in their own courts under their 
own contract law. 
 
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
18. Id. § 1338(b). 
19. Unfair Competition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
20. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Del Madera 
Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987)).  See also Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 
Inc., 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006); eScholar, LLC v. Otis Educ. Sys., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 329 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
21. Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
22. Id. at 1394. 
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III.  WISCONSIN AEROSPACE AUTHORITY PREEMPTION 
If we were to apply the precedent of antitrust and contract law, there is a 
possibility that Wisconsin’s laws could be preempted based solely upon their 
construction.  Back to our hypothetical, if Astronautics Corporation 
misappropriated research from Orbital Sciences, and then entered the 
previously mentioned contract with the WAA, the contract could cause 
Wisconsin laws to be preempted by federal laws, and those laws would violate 
federal antitrust laws.  This is even more likely if a researcher employed by 
Orbital Sciences discovered a new way of measuring altitude, but left 
Astronautics Corporation for Orbital Sciences.  Further, it is even more likely 
given how lucrative such contract would be for the WAA. 
A. Wisconsin Aerospace Authority Violates Antitrust Laws 
Beginning with the Parker test, the WAA will violate antitrust laws under 
the previous hypothetical.  In respect to the first prong of the test, the WAA 
does not explicitly state that it is allowing anticompetitive activity.  While the 
enumerated powers allows for the WAA to create and maintain a spaceport and 
acquire intellectual property, it does not explicitly state that the WAA can or 
will engage anti-competitive authority to do so.23  Furthermore, the duties of 
the Authority are to promote and recommend actions taken by the state in the 
aerospace industry and to “[a]dvertise and promote . . . the development and 
utilization of spaceport facilities . . . and aerospace services of the authority 
[and to] develop, promote, attract, and maintain space-related businesses in this 
state.”24  That language is actually the opposite of engaging in antitrust 
behavior; the WAA should engage with multiple businesses with their 
authority, not exclude.25  Nowhere in this language is the WAA granted 
exclusive authority to exercise anti-competitive behavior.  Even further, the 
limiting language of “aerospace services of the authority” implies that the state 
will compete with other non-state actors in the aerospace service industry.26  
However, being the only authorized Wisconsin spaceport allows for 
anticompetitive behavior since an exclusive contract with the only spaceport 
would prevent any other competitive behavior.  Thus, conforming to the 
holding of North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
 
23.  WIS. STAT. § 114.62 (2015–16).  
24.  Id. 
 25.    Id. 
26. This language implies that there will be other public or private organizations that require 
the services of the authority, and are seeking the authority over seeking services elsewhere, which 
could include, but is not limited to private authorities, public corporation, or other state-owned entities 
from other states.  See infra notes 51, 53, 57. 
05 THIBODEAU.FINAL.FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  10:47 AM 
2017] WIS. PATENT ACQUISITION IN FINAL FRONTIER 95 
 
Commission, the first prong of the test fails due to a lack of explicit language.27 
The second prong of the test is not so easily passed, because the WAA 
allows for supervision of the anti-competitive conduct.  According to the 
statute, the WAA board members are composed of six individuals nominated 
by the governor, one member of the senate, one member of the assembly, and 
the director of the Wisconsin Space Grant Consortium.28  The Wisconsin Space 
Grant Consortium is authorized under federal law regulating NASA’s efforts to 
encourage state participation in development of local aerospace industries, and 
thus would not be required to ensure supervision of state conduct.  Additionally, 
the statute does not require the six appointed members to ensure that such 
conduct would conform to state standards.  However, the senator and 
assemblyperson would be required to do so, based upon their duties as 
legislators, and their oaths of office and standards of conduct.29  Thus, 
anticompetitive activities would pass the second prong because the WAA 
would be actively supervised, as outlined in Federal Trade Commission v. 
Ticor Title Insurance.30  However, such supervision presumes that the entity 
would be authorized to engage in anticompetitive activity, which is to be not 
explicitly stated, as discussed earlier  Thus, regardless of any supervision, the 
state would fail the Parker Test, and would be found to be in violation of federal 
antitrust law. 
B.  The WAA Would Be Preempted 
Back to the hypothetical, if the WAA executed a contract to gain partial 
ownership of a patent derived from the misappropriated altitude measuring 
device, naturally the claim of patent misappropriation would be preempted by 
federal law.  Beginning with the language of the federal laws, section 1338(a) 
of Title 28 of the U.S. Code states that “district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents [and] copyrights.”31  Further, when a patent is the result of 
misappropriation, the patent is unenforceable and invalid under the laws 
governing patent applications.32  Even further, section 1338(b) clearly states 
that federal jurisdiction will be given to a claim that asserts “unfair competition 
 
27. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1111. 
28. WIS. STAT. § 114.61.  
29. See WIS. STAT. §§ 19.01, 19.45. Section 19.01 states that the senator must uphold the 
constitution of the State of Wisconsin, while Section 19.45 states that the senator must not engage in 
unlawful conduct. 
30. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992). 
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
 32.   See Timely Prod. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 298 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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when joined with a substantial and related claim under . . . patent” law.33  And 
since unfair competition includes misappropriation as well as mere 
anticompetitive behavior, a claim that asserts misappropriation and 
anticompetitive behavior through contract would be under federal jurisdiction.  
Applying this to our hypothetical, the claim of misappropriation would be 
preempted by federal law if the claim is strictly based upon the patent that 
results in the misappropriation. 
Combined, the contract to acquire a patent and the misappropriation that 
allowed the device to be created and patented would result in the laws that 
created a state-owned entity to be found in violation of antitrust laws.  Any state 
contract law would be preempted by federal law since the purpose of contract 
was to acquire a patent.  Additionally, state misappropriation law would be 
preempted for the same reason.  This would remove claims on the contract to 
federal court under antitrust laws, rather than in state courts under state contract 
law.  Once antitrust laws are applied under the Parker test, as explained, the 
laws that enable the state-owned agency would be found to violate antitrust 
laws. 
In our hypothetical, if the WAA was not diligent in researching how 
Astronautic Corporation of America developed its invention, they could be 
liable once they become part owner of the patent.34  If they were part owner, 
then jurisdiction could fall under the federal courts after the patent was issued, 
pursuant to sections 1338(a) and 1338(b), regardless of the contract.  That is to 
say, while the contract allowed the WAA to become implicit in the 
misappropriation, and challenges to a contract would normally fall under the 
jurisdiction of the state, such challenges would fall under federal jurisdiction 
because it is misappropriation and joined with a substantial and related patent 
claim.  In other words,  it would fall under federal jurisdiction because it is 
misappropriation, regardless of the fact that the misappropriation was through 
contract.  Thus, the WAA’s contract itself would allow for the preemption of 
state laws if the validity of the patent was ever challenged through a claim of 
unfair competition. 
 
C. Combining to a Void 
Generally, if any action were to be brought against the WAA, it would most 
likely be pursued under state law, and thus, the state laws that allowed the 
misappropriation would probably still be upheld.  But if a plaintiff could show 
 
33. 28 U.S.C. 1338(b) (2012). 
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2012) for an explanation of a tenancy in common of patent 
ownership. 
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that the primary reason for the misappropriation was a result of antitrust 
activities to acquire a patent, then those laws that allowed the patent acquisition 
could also be in question because of those antitrust activities. 
The problem in this hypothetical is combining federal preemption with 
antitrust laws to show that the laws themselves created the antitrust activity.  In 
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the Supreme Court held that 
the board’s actions in preventing non-license-required dental whitening 
violated antitrust laws.35  Additionally, in Ticor Title, the Court held that 
Wisconsin’s price fixing of insurance rates was in violation of antitrust laws, 
even though such price fixing was allowed by statute.36  However, in 324 
Liquor Corporation v. Duffy, the Court held that New York state laws that fixed 
liquor prices violated Sherman Act antitrust laws.37  Through each of these 
cases, regulatory schemes are shown to violate antitrust laws, but in 324 Liquor, 
state laws themselves can violate federal antitrust laws.  In 324 Liquor, the law 
itself dictated the anticompetitive activity and thus, the law was held to be void.  
Wisconsin laws, however, do not directly state that the WAA can perform 
antitrust activity when acquiring intellectual property. 
Wisconsin statute section 114.62 does not explicitly allow for antitrust 
activity.  Rather, it gives the WAA the authority to acquire patents. But, under 
Wisconsin statute section 114.63, the WAA must “[a]ct as a central 
clearinghouse and source of information in this state for spaceports, spaceport 
facilities, spaceport services, aerospace facilities, and aerospace services, 
including furnishing such information to [the government], educational 
institutions, and the general public.”38  Additionally, the WAA must “[a]ssist 
any state agency, municipality, or other governmental unit, upon its request, in 
the development of any spaceport or spaceport facility.”39  This presents the 
problem that the WAA controls all information in the development of 
spaceports, as well, as helps create them.  In turn, this means that the WAA is 
the only authority in the state that could allow for any spaceport development 
through its clearinghouse and facilitation duties.  Thus, the state, in enacting 
this law, gives the authority to develop any future spaceport to solely to the 
WAA. 
In effect, the WAA is the sole authority in the state that controls all 
spaceports, regardless of whether they are run by the WAA or any other public 
 
35. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1111. 
36. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992).  The law, as written allowed for 
explicit anticompetitive activity, but the actual activity was not supervised properly, thus violating the 
second prong of the Parker Doctrine. 
37. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987). 
38. WIS. STAT. § 114.63(8) (2015–16).  
39. Id.  
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or private entity.  Under the precedent in Ticor Title, as well as North Carolina 
Board of Dental Examiners, this statute itself would not be subject to antitrust 
activity.  Section 114.63 constructively allows for antitrust activity when all 
spaceport regulation and information must be channeled through the WAA’s 
clearinghouse.40  However, Section 114.62 does not provide for any antitrust 
activity, regardless of construction.41  Rather, it merely allows for the WAA to 
acquire patents, not to engage in antitrust activity. 
D. Wisconsin Intellectual Property Acquisition 
To connect these Wisconsin laws back to patent misappropriation, a 
claimant must show that the WAA engaged in antitrust activity to acquire that 
patent.  But this creates the problem that the antitrust activity must be rooted in 
section 114.63 for the antitrust activity to be allowed.  However, this is where 
an exclusive contract would create problems.  If the contract required the WAA 
to temporarily prevent spaceport authorization in exchange for partial 
ownership in any new acquired patents, the antitrust activity would be rooted 
in the contract, not section 114.63, even though section 114.63 dictates the 
antitrust activity.  Since the acquisition is rooted in a contract that creates 
antitrust activity, the law that allowed intellectual property acquisition—section 
114.62—would be subject to federal antitrust laws, not 114.63—the section that 
allows antitrust activity.  To summarize, intellectual property acquisition by the 
WAA could be held in violation of antitrust law because the law that allowed 
the contract for the acquisition allowed anticompetitive behavior.  And since 
the federal laws preempt the state laws, the contract itself is not in question, but 
rather the laws themselves. 
But such voiding of these intellectual property laws requires many steps 
and severe negligence on the part of the WAA.  First, Astronautics Corporation 
would have to misappropriate the research from Orbital Sciences.  Next, 
Astronautics Corporation would have to enter an exclusive contract with the 
WAA.  That contract would have to grant partial ownership of any patent to the 
WAA; the contract would have to ensure that the WAA does not assist in the 
development of any other similar patents, and the contract would have to ensure 
that the WAA does not allow the creation of any other spaceport or 
dissemination of any information.  Furthermore, after the patent is acquired, 
Orbital Technologies must claim the following: the information was 
misappropriated, the federal jurisdiction is appropriate, the WAA can engage 
 
40. Interestingly enough, technically speaking, since this comment is an academic endeavor, it 
is in violation of this provision, since the majority of information on this spaceport comes from sources 
not originally the WAA. 
41. WIS. STAT. § 114.62.  
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in anticompetitive activity through its clearinghouse, and the WAA did so 
through its enabled power of exclusive contracting and its acquisition of 
patents.  Finally, the WAA would have to neglect researching the creation of 
the invention, as well as contract into anticompetitive activity. 
While these chain of events are hard to imagine, it is less hard to imagine 
once the financial benefits are realized.  If the patent proves lucrative enough, 
and the contract is for such a short period of time, such as the two to three years 
for development and acquisition of a patent, it might prove to be worthwhile of 
the WAA.  This is particularly so, considering the cost of creating a new 
spaceport, and the lack of its current use.  These costs could be high if 
Astronautics Corporation was either negligent in revealing the nature of the 
device, or the employee was negligent in revealing his previous research.  
Nonetheless, two to three years is too short a time to develop a new spaceport, 
and short enough to assume a corporate secret will remain secret to prevent 
others from experimenting on the same development. 
However, voiding these laws hinges on how the court would apply the law 
to this hypothetical.  In terms of the misappropriation, the law is clear that the 
claim falls under federal jurisdiction, and the trade secret was misappropriated 
or the patent was granted under unfair competition.  On the other hand, the court 
has a variety of ways to address the antitrust application to the 
misappropriation.  First, it could hold the anticompetitive activity created by 
the contract to be a violation, without touching the actual state laws that allowed 
that activity.  Second, it could hold that the antitrust activity is rooted in the 
clearinghouse duties of section 114.63, and thus those laws are in violation of 
federal antitrust laws.  Third, it could hold that while section 114.63 allows for 
the antitrust activity, the actual antitrust activity was in the WAA’s enumerated 
power to create exclusive contracts, and thus that section is in violation.  Fourth, 
it could hold that because Wisconsin law that enumerates the power of 
intellectual property acquisition (section 114.61) is virtually unbound, it 
allowed for the anticompetitive activity and thus was in violation, and is void.  
Fifth, the court could hold that given the virtually limitless power in each of 
these sections, they are all in violation because they allow anticompetitive 
behavior without explicitly stating so.  Sixth, because each of these allows 
behavior, but does not necessarily require it, none are in violation, but rather, 
the lack of state supervision in entering the contract was the violation.  And 
finally, the court could merely decide that the language in section 114.63 does 
allow for anticompetitive activity, and there was adequate oversight, and thus 
no law is in violation.  However, given the ambiguity of the law, and the conflict 
of the WAA’s exclusive control through the clearinghouse and its duty to assist 
in development of other spaceports, it will most likely find that there is no 
explicit anticompetitive provision. 
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Nonetheless, if the WAA acquires a patent through another’s 
misappropriation and through an exclusive non-compete contract, they could 
violate antitrust law, and the section that allows that acquisition could be void. 
IV. RESOLUTION 
The primary issue at hand here is the breadth of the law that has been 
created.  Both the provision allowing the WAA to acquire intellectual property 
rights and contract are virtually limitless, allowing for those provisions to be 
subject to a variety of preempting laws—particularly, federal patent and 
antitrust laws.  However, such antitrust activity is not unknown to the space 
industry.  This is evidenced in what René Joseph Rey calls the LAF Boycott: 
the boycott of large aerospace firms by small aerospace firms because of the 
federal government’s antitrust-like activity in withholding intellectual 
property.42  In creating exclusive contracts with the four largest contractors, 
NASA effectively engaged in antitrust activity to the exclusion of many space 
companies, which compromised their access to any intellectual property 
licensing.  However, unlike NASA, the potential for antitrust activity of the 
WAA is not necessarily rooted in contracts, but rather in the construction of the 
empowering laws.  One way of preventing this antitrust activity would be to 
introduce limiting language into how intellectual property is acquired, similar 
to the language in the statutes that empowered the Alaska Aerospace 
Corporation.  Other options, such as appointing an official whose sole purpose 
is to prevent intellectual property abuse or removing that power from the WAA, 
could also be viable.  Nonetheless, the sole solution is to reform the law that 
allows for virtually unfettered intellectual property acquisition. 
Intellectual property acquisitions in aerospace industries do not necessarily 
have to exist in a bubble.  Rey addressed this when he suggested a similar 
aerospace program to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, which 
allowed for the licensing and sharing of various intellectual properties to boost 
the aircraft industry, particularly during World War I.43  He argues that because 
the weight of NASA programs were for government, military, and defense 
purposes, rather than commercial exploitation of space, the government 
effectively prevented new space companies from entering the market.  “[T]he 
government, acting in collusion with the large aerospace firms through 
exclusive contracting practices, has created a de facto Federal monopoly on all 
 
42. See René Joseph Rey, Regulatory Challenges, Antitrust Hurdles, Intellectual Property 
Incentives, and the Collective Development of Aerospace Vehicle-Enabling Technologies and 
Standards: Creating an Industry Foundation, 35 J. SPACE L. 75, 93 (2009).   
43. Id. at 77.  NACA was founded in 1915, however, its intellectual property sharing agreement 
began in 1917.  NACA was eventually absorbed into NASA in 1958 and its authority essentially 
dissolved. 
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AV technology development activities.”44 This antitrust activity was 
challenged by Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) when they sued 
Boeing and Lockheed-Martin from creating their joint venture, the United 
Launch Alliance (ULA).45  However, the court ruled against SpaceX due to 
ripeness and standing, since SpaceX had no competing contracts and the ULA 
had not yet been awarded one.46  Nonetheless, Rey suggests that such antitrust 
activity could be resolved with a patent licensing program similar to the one 
under NACA that would allow new space companies to participate in the 
commercialization of space.47 
However, while the space industry is not new to antitrust activity in its 
patent licensing, antitrust activity in patent acquisition requires a different 
approach when that acquisition is authorized by statute.  SpaceX was denied its 
claim based upon ineligibility to compete for contracts.48  Additionally, Rey 
addresses the creation of antitrust activity under which space technologies are 
patented. However, he admits that it is through the contracts themselves that 
antitrust-like activity is conducted, not the laws that empower NASA to acquire 
patents.49  But, according to our hypothetical, the contract itself might not be 
the issue, but rather the laws that enable the WAA to obtain patents.  In those 
NASA contracts, the contractor may retain any intellectual property,50 whereas 
the WAA is empowered to obtain intellectual property rights, and could do so 
through exclusive contracts. 
So, if the statutes themselves allow for intellectual property acquisition 
through antitrust behavior, the easy answer is to fix the statute, so that it will 
not.  However, that is easier said than done.  Eleanor M. Fox and Deborah 
Healey suggest that in order to combat antitrust behavior “the law should 
integrate free movement, state restraint and competition principles along lines 
drawn by the European Union.”51  Additionally, D. Daniel Sokol suggests “to 
 
44.  Id. at 121–22. 
45. Space Expl. Techs. Corp. v. Boeing Co., No. CV 05-07533 FMC MANX, 2006 WL 
7136649 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2006) aff’d, 281 F. App’x 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). SpaceX 
claimed antitrust and unfair business practices, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act. 
46. Id. at 5. 
47. Rey, supra note 42 at 144. 
48. Space Expl., 2006 WL 7136649, at *6.  
49. Rey, supra note 42 at 121. 
50. Id. at 123, (citing Island One Society, A Cooperative Agreement Notice: Reusable Launch 
Vehicle (RLV) Advanced Technology Demonstrator X-33 (Jan. 1995), available at http:// 
www.islandone.org/Launch/X33-CAN.html [https://perma.cc/Y3LZ-Z7S2].  
51. Eleanor M. Fox & Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition-the Role for 
Competition Law, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 814 (2014).  In their article, the authors note that the 
European Union effectively prevents anticompetitive behavior that could prevent competition.  Id. at 
793. 
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forbid the [state-owned entity] to compete in the non-regulated related field.”52  
He suggests that the laws prevent the antitrust activity to occur in the first 
place.53  While these suggestions are for federally-owned entities, they could 
easily apply to Wisconsin.  Additionally, while patents themselves are heavily 
regulated, the authorship of patents is not explicitly regulated to non-state-
owned entities, and thus could protect government and non-government entities 
from application abuse and unnecessary litigation. 
But the question remains: how could such provisions be applied?  Looking 
to other states, the easy answer is to limit the language of the statute.  The 
Alaska Aerospace Corporation is a state-owned entity, which manages the 
Pacific Spaceport Complex, and has thus far completed seventeen launches to 
date.54  In creating the AAC, the state legislature only authorized the 
corporation to “apply for and hold in the name of the corporation patents, 
copyrights, and other intellectual property.”55  In limiting its intellectual 
property acquisition to the name of the corporation, the law could be construed 
to prevent joint ownership, as in our example, or prevent any other type of 
acquisition, such as licensing, technology transfers, or march-in rights.  
However, this depends on how the law would be tested, should there ever be a 
challenge to it.  Additionally, this does not necessarily exclude any antitrust 
activity in creating an invention whose sole patent owner is the AAC.  
Nonetheless, it does limit the AAC to a very specific method of patent 
acquisition; it must be in the name of the corporation. 
Another option would be to remove that authority all together.  New 
Mexico has not granted their spaceport any authority to acquire any intellectual 
property.56  ln the powers granted to the New Mexico Regional Spaceport 
District, no language is included to enumerate the power to acquire any 
intellectual property.  Rather, they only have the authority to create and operate 
a spaceport similar to any regional airport.57  This is not to say that they could 
not acquire any intellectual property.  New Mexico courts could construe the 
 
52.   D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713, 1803 (2009). 
53.   Id. 
54.  See ALASKA STAT. § 26.27.010 (2014); About Us, ALASKA AEROSPACE,  
http://www.akaerospace.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/N9QT-5VXT](last visited Mar. 28, 2016) ; 
Launch Manifest, ALASKA AEROSPACE, http://www.akaerospace.com/about-us/launch-manifest 
[https://perma.cc/7BG4-SL3B] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).  
55. ALASKA STAT. § 26.27.100(21) (emphasis added).  Note that this includes copyright, which 
could be applied to any manuals, diagrams, educational material, and any other publication they create, 
which would be useful since AS § 26.27.010 establishes the AAC to work in consort with the 
University of Alaska in their astrophysical research.  
56. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-16-6 (2015). 
57. Id.  See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-2-1–64-2-2 (2015).  
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law to allow it since such acquisition is not regulated by their statutes.  But 
since it is a state-owned entity, and because the statute lists the powers that the 
Spaceport District has, a court would most likely find that they do not have such 
powers. 
Nonetheless, the remedy for Wisconsin is to change the statute to prevent 
intellectual property acquisition through antitrust activity.  The law currently 
limits the WAA to any intellectual property “acquired under federal or state 
law, common law, or the law of any foreign country.”58  This could be the 
limiting language already needed.  In our hypothetical, because the acquisition 
is based upon trade secret misappropriation, that acquisition would already be 
invalid.  However, the claim could still hold if the WAA still engaged in 
antitrust activity without the misappropriation, albeit, on a state level, rather 
than a federal one.  And since the law is not explicit in allowing antitrust activity 
in intellectual property acquisition, only the courts could decide if that 
acquisition was in violation of the law.  Thus, the state would still have to 
defend against litigation, and could still be held liable. 
But, additionally, it could be that the WAA would never engage in such 
activity.  The Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority, which operates the 
Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport, has similar language in their statute, 
allowing for unfettered intellectual property acquisition.59  But, the Authority 
has yet to engage in any antitrust activity to acquire patents, and has thus far 
completed nine launches.60  If this is the case, no change would be necessary.  
However, we do not live in a perfect world, and a lucrative contract could help 
the WAA.  One option would be to create a new board position that oversees 
any potential conflicts, particularly those that could be construed as antitrust 
activities.  But this would not solve the problem of the ambiguous language of 
the statute.  Thus, the best option is to revise the law to limit the WAA’s 
intellectual property acquisition by preventing it from entering exclusive 
contracts that grant any intellectual property, and that effectively prohibit 
competition.  This would allow for competitors to test their similar inventions, 
if not identical inventions, and the state would be absolved of any potential 
antitrust litigation. 
NICHOLAS J. THIBODEAU* 
 
 
58. WIS. STAT. § 114.62(10)(d) (2015–16).  
59. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2204 (2012). 
60. See Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority “History of MARS,” 
http://www.vaspace.org/index.php/about-virginia-space/overview [https://perma.cc/DB62-GC72] 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2016).  
 *  J.D., Marquette University Law School, May 2017. 
